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1.  Introduction 
Venture capitalists are described as experts in the field of high-risk company funding (see for 
example FENN/LIANG/PROWSE (1997), SAHLMAN (1990) and LERNER (1995)). They not only 
specialize by concentrating on certain industry sectors and specific stages of a company’s 
development, but also actively engage in monitoring and consulting activities. Since they 
often serve as members on the “Aufsichtsrat”
1 and frequently invest their capital based on 
whether intermediate goals have been reached, they are able to influence the behavior and 
corporate strategy of the company under consideration. Their incentive to improve corporate 
governance is on the one hand due to the finite life of the partnership and - since their 
compensation is linked to the firm’s performance - to the maximization of the exit price.
2 On 
the other hand, being repeat players who regularly have to raise new funds, venture capitalists 
face reputational risk. One would therefore expect that, much like prestigious underwriters or 
auditors, venture capitalists certify the quality of a company when going public.  
Within the extensive underpricing literature some empirical studies examine whether the 
market honors the presumed monitoring-activities of venture capitalists. Since this control 
benefit may reduce the ex-ante uncertainty for future investors, it should lead to lower 
underpricing. Underpricing is defined as the spread between the initial offering price and the 
opening price on the first day of trading. However, empirical evidence is mixed. Among 
others, BARRY ET AL. (1990), MEGGINSON/WEISS (1991) and LIN/SMITH (1998) confirm the 
certification role of venture capitalists for the US market. They find evidence for venture 
capital (VC)-backed IPOs suffering less underpricing than non VC-backed IPOs. On the other 
hand, FRANCIS/HASAN (2001) and SMART/ZUTTER (2000), who also analyze US data, find 
initial returns of venture-backed IPOs on average to be higher than those of non venture-
backed IPOs.  
LJUNGQVIST (1999)  using the data set of MEGGINSON/WEISS (1991), demonstrates that the 
finding of venture-backed IPOs appearing less underpriced has to be attributed to the 
incentives of the old shareholders to reduce underpricing and not to the circumstance of 
venture-backing. Old shareholders will care for the pricing of an issue or for the choice of an 
                                                 
1   The „Aufsichtsrat“ is similar to the supervisory board. However, German stock companies are governed by 
two boards. The supervisory board on the one hand is elected by and represents shareholders. Moreover, it 
appoints the company’s executive board. The executive board on the other hand comprises firm managers 
and oversees day-to-day operations.  
2   When selling at the time of the initial public offering (IPO), this price is equivalent to the offer price.   2
underwriter to the extent that such decisions affect their wealth. Studies by  HABIB/ 
LJUNGQVIST  (2001) and  LJUNGQVIST (1999) illustrate, that underpricing-induced wealth 
losses increase with the number of shares sold in the IPO. As a consequence companies 
selling a lot of old shares should show little underpricing, due to the incentives of the old 
shareholders to reduce underpricing.  
This study contributes to the underpricing discussion. It analyzes the certification role of 
venture capitalists and underwriting banks
3 at the IPO, exploring a unique German data set of 
companies going public at Neuer Markt. Moreover, this study examines in line with the 
argumentation offered by  BARRY (1989) the incentives of the old shareholders to take 
influence on underpricing. Similar to the studies by  HABIB/LJUNGQVIST  (2001) and 
LJUNGQVIST (1999), who model underpricing as endogenous to the pre-IPO shareholders’ 
problem of minimizing the total wealth loss in an IPO, two-stage  least square regression 
calculations are applied. The analysis of  the German  market  is of special interest, since it 
offers the opportunity to analyze a market, in which banks have considerable importance 
serving as underwriters and at the s ame time as founders of VC companies and/or their 
financiers, which contrasts to the Anglo-American markets. Moreover the German VC market 
has only recently gained some importance within the financial services industry. As a 
consequence only little empirical work is available to date.
4 Few information exist about the 
players on the German VC market, their investments and divestment activities. Thus, this 
paper has two objectives, first, to enlarge the level of knowledge with respect to venture 
capital financing in Germany  focusing on underpricing  and second to compare the results 
found with those of international studies. 
The main  result of this study  with respect to underpricing  is, that venture-backed IPOs at 
Neuer Markt experience considerably more underpricing than non-venture backed IPOs. This 
phenomenon can not be explained following arguments in the literature.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the history of venture capital in 
Germany and its driving factors briefly. Section 3 outlines the impact of the introduction of 
the Neuer Markt at Frankfurt Stock Exchange on the primary equity market in Germany. 
                                                 
3   Due to the narrow underwriting market until 1998, only two empirical studies exist analyzing the 
certification role of underwriters in Germany (see WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER (1994) and KASERER/KEMPF 
(1995)). 
4    Of recent date are the papers by TYKVOVA (2003),  RINDERMANN (2003),  SCHÄFER/WERWATZ/ZIMMER-
MANN (2003),  BOTTAZZI/DA RIN (2002) and FRANZKE/GROHS/LAUX (2003), which analyse the German 
Venture Capital Market.   3
Moreover, it provides an analysis of the IPO-costs for Neuer Markt issues. In section 4 – 
based on the theoretical literature on underpricing and certification mechanisms – the testable 
hypotheses are formulated. Section 5 describes the data set and the design of the empirical 
analysis. In sections 6 and 7 descriptive statistics and the empirical results are presented. The 
paper concludes with a summary and an outlook in section 8. 
2.  Venture Capital Financing in Germany 
The definition of “venture capital” differs in the literature
5. In the Anglo-American under-
standing “venture capital” is often used in the context of early-stage (such as seed and start-up 
financing) and expansion financing. In Germany, “venture capital” is more comprehensive, 
since it also includes later-stage capital (such as bridge-, buy out-, and turnaround-financing).
6 
While the former types of investments are crucial for the development and implementation of 
business ideas by young growth companies, the latter types of investments are important for 
capital structure reasons of more mature, small to medium-sized companies. To be aware of 
venture capital’s different meanings is important when interpreting (German) figures and in 
particular when comparing empirical results of various international studies.  
In the 60s, about twenty years later than in the UK and the US, the first German  equity 
investment companies were founded, most of  them as subsidiaries of banks.
7 Nevertheless, 
before the early 80s a German VC market did not really exist despite early and continuing 
attempts by the German government to stimulate the availability of equity financing for small 
to medium-sized companies.  The literature analyzing the manifold reasons for the 
backwardness of the German VC industry discusses in particular the social environment (e.g., 
status of entrepreneurs, the relationship of academia and trade and industry), legal and tax 
regulations and the exit conditions for venture capitalists in a bank-dominated financial 
system (see e.g.  LEOPOLD/FROMMANN (1998),  BECKER/HELLMANN  (2002), H ELLMANN/ 
FIEDLER  (2001), B ETSCH/GROH/SCHMIDT  (2000)  and  FRANZKE/GROHS/LAUX  (FORTH-
COMING)).  
                                                 
5   For a deeper discussion see e.g.  BYGRAVE/TIMMONS  (1992), S TEDLER  (1987),  BETSCH/GROH/SCHMIDT 
(2000) and BALZER (2000). 
6   This broader expression is comparable to the American understanding of private equity. 
7   See  LEOPOLD/FROMMANN  (1998) and  NEVERMANN/FALK (1986). I n England (UK)  the  Industrial and 
Commercial Finance Corporation Ltd. (ICFC), today known as 3i, was established, i.e. in 1945, by the 
initiative of the Bank of England and in cooperation with major banks. Also, in the United States (US) the 
first professional VC company named  American Research and Development Corporation (ARD) was 
already founded in 1949.   4
However, finally in 1997 the German VC industry entered into an unprecedented period. A 
remarkable development not only in terms of volume, but also with regard to the distribution 
of the funds among financial stages and industrial sectors took place.
8, 
9  
Figure 1: Total Portfolio Held by Members of the BUNDESVERBAND DEUTSCHER 
KAPITALBETEILIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFTEN E.V. (BVK) (in € Billion) 
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Between 1996 and 2000, about €10.8 billion in total were newly invested in 6300 companies, 
which is 68% of total new VC investments and 47% of all VC financed companies over the 
last 30 years.
10 With regard to the distribution among financing stages a strong movement 
towards early-stage financing could be discerned. While in 1996 only about 14% of gross 
investments were in early-stage companies, this reached about 36% in 2000. 
The expansion would have been i mpossible without a fundamental change in Germany’s 
funding and investment environment. Accompanied by regulatory changes
11 and an upswing 
in the German equity culture
12, the launch of the Neuer Markt in March 1997, offering a 
                                                 
8   See Figure 1. Figures containing data of the members of the BVK account to (according to BVK) 90% of 
the volume of the German VC market.  
9   For the development of gross investments of members of the BVK (in  € Mio.) and the number of 
beneficiary companies see figure A.1. in the appendix. 
10  Compare BVK (Yearbook 2001).  
11   Amendment of the “Gesetz für Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften“ (UBGG) within the changes of the 
3rd „Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz“. 
12   The DAI-FACTBOOK (2002) of the “Deutsches Aktieninstitut” (DAI) shows that stocks constitute about 12% 
(8%) of the financial assets of private households in 2000 (1996).   5
further exit mechanism for venture capitalists, has to be seen as most stimulating for the 
German venture capital industry.
13 Compared to other strategies, exiting a VC investment by 
means of an IPO became a truly attractive proposition, not only as it lead to high valuations of 
the portfolio companies but also opened venture capitalists the opportunity to attract attention 
and credit within a still relatively young VC market.
14  
The increasing importance of IPOs as exit vehicle for German venture capitalists in times of 
active stock markets is clearly reflected in the numbers of the volume and the corresponding 
percentage of exit vehicles as stated by BVK Statistics (2002) and shown in Table 1. From 
1998 to 2000 the Neuer Markt covered on average about 68% of the volume of all venture-
backed IPOs by members of the BVK.
15  
Table 1: Volume and Percentage of Exit Vehicle as stated by BVK Statistics (2002) 
The classification “Other” contains, among other things, selling to a financial investor or a venture capitalist (i.e. 
secondary purchase). The abbreviation “n.a.” stand for “not available”. 
   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
  € Mio  %  € Mio  %  € Mio  %  € Mio  %  € Mio  %  € Mio  % 
IPOs total    19.9      2.7    75.2    14.0    97.1    12.6    116.3      9.2        7.3      0.4        0.0      0.0 
IPOs NM     n. a.    n. a.    47.0      8.8    44.5      5.8    105.8      8.4        2.1      0.1        0.0      0.0 
Divestment 
after IPO     n. a.    n. a.     n. a.    n. a.    48.6      6.3      40.4      3.2     138.5      7.5     122.3      5.7 
Trade Sale  248.5    34.1  119.6    22.3  192.8    25.1    492.4    39.0     379.1    20.4     651.6    30.6 
Buy Back  157.0    21.6  161.1    30.0  159.5    20.7    215.7    17.1     333.8    18.0       78.1      3.7 
Write Off  109.4    15.0    91.5    17.0  161.1    21.0    232.1    18.4     673.8    36.3     941.2    44.1 
Other  193.3    26.6    90.0    16.8  110.0    14.3    164.6    13.1     322.6    17.4     338.7    15.9 
Total  728.1  100.0  537.4  100.0  769.1  100.0  1,261.5  100.0  1,855.1  100.0  2,131.8  100.0 
  
However, as can bee seen in Table 1 since 2001 parallel to the collapse of stock markets the 
issuing activity of venture-backed companies has come to a near stand still. At the same time 
the percentage of companies that had to be written off increased to more than 35%.  
 
                                                 
13   According to BECKER/HELLMANN (2002), the launch of the “Geregelter Markt” in 1987 had almost no effect 
on the venture capital industry. 
14   See for example SMITH/SMITH (2000). For an empirical analysis on the efficient pattern on exit vehicles see 
CUMMING/MACINTOSH (2003) 
15   The remaining 32% can be split into IPOs on other German stock markets (14%) and listings on foreign 
stock exchanges (18%) such as the NASDAQ.   6
3.  Germany’s Neuer Markt and the Costs of Raising Capital  
The Neuer Markt was Germany’s trading segment for innovative growth companies. It was 
launched on March 10, 1997 as a subsidiary of the Deutsche Börse AG, with the objective to 
attract small- to medium-sized, young technology firms. As figure 2 indicates, the number of 
companies that have gone public in Germany or rather on the New Market increased 
dramatically during the IPO boom period. From March 1997 through March 2000, over 200 
companies went public on the Neuer Markt, while at the same time new listings at the first 
and second segment stayed close to their previous levels. In total about 320 new listings were 
recorded at Frankfurt Stock Exchange for that period.
16 However, as a consequence of the 
down turn of shares listed at the Neuer Markt since March 2000, the going public of 
companies became much more difficult and finally almost impossible, which is particularly 
reflected in the numbers for the period March 10, 2001 to March 10, 2002. Finally in 2003 the 
Neuer Markt has been dissolved. 
Figure 2: New Issues at Frankfurt Stock Exchange
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16   According to  JOHNSON (2000), from 1949 through 1996 a total of only 356 companies went public in 
Germany. 
17   On the SMAX (Small Cap Exchange) - introduced in April 1999 - second market stocks were traded. The 
listing requirements of the SMAX followed - apart from small modifications - those of the Neuer Markt.   7
Although Neuer Markt had from the very beginning much stricter listing and disclosure 
requirements than the established exchanges
18, Deutsche Börse AG deemed it necessary to 
tighten these again and again (five times since March 1997), demanding further transparency 
of the companies listed and extending the package of sanctions Deutsche Börse AG was able 
to apply. 
What is remarkable about the “how to go public” at the Neuer Markt is that from March 1997 
to March 2002 all but one company (TRIUS AG)
19 chose book-building to price the shares.
20 
Although during the observation period two out of three issues were oversubscribed
21, the 
final issue price was always fixed within the book-building range
22 and never above; merely 
2.8% of all IPOs at Neuer Markt
23 were priced below the minimum price limit. Following 
LJUNGQVIST/JENKINSON  (2000), the reluctance to price outside the range is distinct in 
Germany compared to international practice. The major potential benefit of book-building, to 
raise the price, if demand is unexpectedly high, seems hardly be exhausted.
24 This is worth 
mentioning as the pricing has influence on the costs of going public. 
In order to analyze the issuing costs for companies at Neuer Markt in more detail, one can 
distinguish between direct and indirect costs, as listed in Table 2.
25 
The direct costs contain for example auditing and consulting fees, underwriting fees, 
marketing costs, or fees raised by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange for the admission to the first 
segment, for the filing of the prospectus and for services provided by Deutsche Börse AG.
26 
                                                 
18   JOHNSON (2000) describes and compares the listing standards in Germany (all markets of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange) and the United States (NYSE, NASDAQ) in detail. The studies by LEUZ (2000), G ERKE/ 
BOSCH (2000) and THEISSEN (1998) assess, whether the high listing and information demands of the Neuer 
Markt lead to the desired increased transparency and improved liquidity, thus providing confidence to 
investors. 
19   Trius AG went public by using a tender procedure, selling the stocks via an auction. 
20   Until 1995 it was common to use the fixed-price method in Germany. One of the main imperfections of this 
method in comparison to book-building is, that underwriting banks have a vital interest to set up a low offer 
price: Since they do not receive any information concerning demand (e.g. through bids by institutional and 
retail investors) before the price fixing, they have more to care for the placement risk. 
21   This is in the interest of the management as an oversubscription of the offering enables the management to 
take more influence on the allotment (see among others BRENNAN/FRANKS (1997)).  
22   72.8% of the IPOs of the sample have been fixed exactly at the upper price limit. 
23   These companies have been ArtStor AG, biolitec AG, e.multi Digitale Dienste AG, Euromed AG, 
Gericom  AG, MSH International Services AG, Neue Sentimental Film AG, nexus AG, Paragon AG. 
24   LJUNGQVIST/JENKINSON (2000) merely conjecture that local regulations, the costs caused by price revisions 
or the market power of domestic investors could serve as explanations for the unwillingness to raise the 
price.  
25   For a cross-sectional analysis of the costs of raising capital in Germany, see KASERER/KRAFT (2000).  
26   Strictly speaking the value of the greenshoe option has to be added to these costs. To stabilize the stock 
price following the IPO, the issuer grants the underwriter the option to sell additional shares at the issue 
price and trade them for a time period of thirty days, if necessary. According to OCHNER (2000), under-
writers do almost constantly retain the earnings gained by selling additional shares at the issue price (or   8
The numbers quoted here are calculated from information indicated in the issuing 
prospectuses of the companies under consideration. During the period of March 1997 through 
March 2002, companies going public on the Neuer Markt had to bear on average total direct 
flotation costs of 8.89% of gross proceeds. As part of these costs the average underwriting fee 
amounted to 5.27% of gross proceeds, respectively.  
Table 2: Costs of Going Public at the Neuer Markt (March 1997 - March 2002) 
„Money left on the table“ is calculated by multiplying the total volume of issues with the initial return or rather the 
underpricing, which is the spread between the opening price at the first day of trading and the initial offering price. 
Dividing the direct flotation costs by the gross proceeds of an issue, one receives the relative direct costs. The relative 
underwriting fee is defined as the underwriting fee paid at IPO normalized by the gross proceeds of the issue.  
 In € thousand 
 respectively %  Mean  Median  Std.Dev. 
90%-
quantile 
10%-
quantile  Obs.
  
 Direct flotation costs    4,723    3,139    7,317     8,527  1,498  300 
 Underwriting fees    3,138    1,981    5,746     5,210    809  300 
 Indirect costs: Money  
 left on the table  27,916    7,735  52,912  75,432  -267  300 
 Gross issue proceeds  69,438   38,713  180,000  116,852  15,750  300 
 Relative direct costs    8.89%    8.32%   3.30%    12.43%   5.78%  300 
 Relative underwriting  
 fees    5.27%    5.20%   1.21%      6.23%    4.05%  300 
 Initial return  49.81%  18.51%  73.13%  160.00%  -0.97%     300
27 
The indirect costs in the form of underpricing
28 average 49.81%. In other words, the average 
issuing company could have raised about € 28 million more, if the first market price would 
have been in correspondence with the offering price. 
Compared to the degree of underpricing on the German IPO market earlier studies
29 report, 
the extent of underpricing at the Neuer Markt seems to be remarkably high. This might be in 
line with the finding of STEHLE/ERHARDT (1999), that small, relatively unknown companies 
have high initial returns. However, RITTER/WELSH (2002), who analyze a data set of US IPOs 
                                                                                                                                                        
eventually a higher secondary market price) and purchase them back as soon as the price of the shares falls 
below the issue price. For an in-depth analysis of the use of the greenshoe option on the Neuer Markt see 
FRANZKE/SCHLAG (2002).  
27   31 of the 300 observations are overpriced as indicated by the negative initial return. 34 observations have an 
initial return of 0.00%. 
28   Underpricing is equivalent to a positive initial return, as the first market price exceeds the offer price. 
29   See for example ERHARDT (1997), LJUNGQVIST (1997), KASERER/KEMPF (1995) or WASSERFALLEN/WITT-
LEDER (1994). A study by LÖFFLER (2000) on the Neuer Markt offers comparable numbers.   9
covering the years of the years 1999 to 2000, find issues to be underpriced by 65% on 
average. 
 
4.  Related Literature and Hypotheses 
The theoretical literature on underpricing (for an extensive overview, see  RITTER/WELSH 
(2002) and JENKINSON/LJUNGQVIST (2001)) can be divided into two main categories. 
There is theoretical work, which focuses on asymmetric information i) within the group of 
investors, ii) between issuer and underwriter, iii) between issuer and investors and iv) between 
underwriter and investors. Secondly, there are institutional explanations that try to attribute 
the existence of underpricing to factors such as price support by the underwriting bank, 
liability regarding the statements made in the issuing prospectus or aspects of corporate 
ownership and control. 
This paper focuses on theories based on asymmetric information  between issuer and 
investors. Within this branch different methods are discussed in order to reduce this “market 
imperfection”. Signaling models e.g. by  ALLEN/FAULHABER  (1989), G RINBLATT/HWANG 
(1989) or WELCH (1989) suggest that from the level of underpricing investors can draw con-
clusions about the quality of the issuing companies.
30  CARTER/MANASTER  (1990)  and 
BOOTH/SMITH  (1986) however emphasize the signaling and certification-of-quality role 
fulfilled by prestigious underwriters, the like goes for auditors and venture capitalists. In the 
following I will concentrate on the latter explanatory approach.  
The certification mechanism works according to the subsequent principle: Given that outside 
investors believe in the information advantage of a third party (underwriter or venture capita-
list), this party is able to certify the quality of a company going public if it has reputational 
capital at stake, “which must be greater than the largest possible one-time wealth transfer or 
side payment which could be obtained by certifying falsely. Furthermore it must be costly for 
the issuing firm to purchase the service of the certifying agent.” (MEGGINSON/WEISS (1991, 
p. 881)) 
                                                 
30   The authors hypothesis is, that given companies plan to carry out a seasoned equity offering, a separating 
equilibrium of high- and low-value firms exists, permitting high-value firms to costly signal their quality by 
underpricing. JENKINSON/LJUNGQVIST (2001) criticize, that the whole mechanism of the models using the 
level of underpricing as signal depends on a two-stage selling decision, which has to preclude shareholder’s 
pre-emptive rights to seasoned offerings of primary equity, in order to recoup the costs of the signal. 
   10
Underwriters and venture capitalists should be able to carry out the role of a certifying 
authority, as they often have insider information. The underwriting bank’s information results 
from the involvement in due diligence activities and a potential lending relationship
31 prior to 
the IPO. Their incentive to examine the quality of the firm in detail goes back to their liability 
extending to statements made in the issuing prospectus.
32 Since venture capitalists belong to 
the actively engaged group of owners, they have profound knowledge about the company’s 
history, quality of management, financial situation and so on. Moreover they involve 
themselves merely out of self-interest, due to the circumstance that their compensation is 
linked to the partnership’s performance. 
Both parties have reputational capital at stake as their future success is closely linked to their 
current reputation. The better the reputation, the easier the attention of trading partners can be 
caught: Underwriters regularly have to attract issuers and venture capitalists frequently have 
to raise new funds.  
One can therefore conclude that the involvement of a prestigious underwriter or venture 
capitalist should certify and credibly signal the quality of the issuing company to the market. I 
thus assume that it should pay to hire a prestigious intermediary, as it leads to a higher offer 
price, which in turn implies lower underpricing. 
Going back to  ROCK  (1986), C ARTER/MANASTER  (1990)  and  BOOTH/SMITH (1986) the 
following hypotheses are formulated: 
1.  The higher the ex-ante uncertainty concerning the issue (vola), the higher the expected 
underpricing. 
2.  The more prestigious the underwriter (UWrank) involved in the IPO, the lower the 
underpricing. 
3a.  The more prestigious the venture capitalist backing the company before the IPO 
(VCrank), the lower the underpricing. 
Because the incentive to engage in the venture-backed company and thus the informative 
value of the signal “backed by a prestigious venture capitalist” depends in particular on the 
                                                 
31   For an extensive discussion of the characteristics of relationship lending in Germany see ELSAS (2001). 
32   It has to be mentioned that this liability can lead to a considerable litigation and thus lawsuit risk. Therefore 
a competitive approach e.g. by  TINIC  (1988)  suggests, that intentional underpricing may serve as an 
insurance against such securities litigation. For counterarguments see ALEXANDER (1993).    11
venture capitalist’s equity holdings prior to the IPO
33, hypothesis 3a should be narrowed 
down: 
3b.  The more prestigious the venture capitalist and the bigger the venture capitalist’s equity 
holdings of the issuer prior to the going public (VCstake), the lower the underpricing. 
Following BARRY (1989) a focus on underpricing alone possibly misleads: Underpricing per 
se is uninformative when not controlling for the former shareholders’ incentives to influence 
underpricing. They will take influence on the pricing of an issue if their wealth is negatively 
affected by the price setting. Figuratively spoken, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists will 
not care for the wealth loss occurring through underpricing when selling a single share, but 
they will care the higher their participation in the offering, i.e. the more shares they sell at the 
IPO.
34  
In line with this hypothesis 4 is introduced: 
4.  The higher the participation ratio  (participation) of former shareholders (e.g. venture 
capitalists or managers, respectively) the lower the underpricing. 
HABIB/LJUNGQVIST (2001)
35 and LJUNGQVIST (1999) extend this idea and model underpricing 
as endogenous to the problem of minimizing the former shareholder’s total wealth loss when 
going public. They assume that the wealth loss of former shareholders at the IPO is a function 
of a.) underpricing, when selling old shares, b.) the dilution of the value of retained shares
36 
and c.) costs arising in connection with activities that reduce underpricing and wealth losses, 
such as extensive marketing efforts prior to the IPO.  
What follows is that there is a trade-off for such shareholders between investing in costly 
actions to reduce underpricing and tolerating higher underpricing. In order to take the 
endogenous relation between the direct non-underwriting costs (exp) (normalized by the 
issuing volume) and underpricing into account, I apply a two-stage least squares approach.
37 
                                                 
33   This is in line with earlier findings of BARRY ET AL (1990). 
34   The participation ratio (participation) is calculated dividing the number of old shares sold by the number of 
shares outstanding before flotation. 
35   In the appendix I present the underlying model by BARRY (1989) and the extension by HABIB/LJUNGQVIST 
(2001). 
36   The dilution factor ( dilution) is determined dividing the number of new shares by the number of shares 
outstanding before flotation. In line with LJUNGQVIST (1999) the dilution factor is taken into account, as 
well, when running the regressions. However, the predicted sign of this parameter is unclear. 
37  The estimation method solves the problem of the ordinary least square approach that “least square estimates 
are inconsistent estimates of a structural equation precisely because they are consistent estimates of a 
mixture of all the equations in the model included” (see GREEN (1997), p. 736).    12
For this technique an instrumental variable is need, which is correlated with the costs, but not 
with underpricing. I choose to use the log of the issuing volume (ln_volume) for this propose. 
5.  Data Set and Design of Analysis 
In total the collected data set contains 353 companies. Each of these companies were listed for 
the first time during the period of March 10
th, 1997 to March 10
th, 2002 on the Neuer Markt. 
The employed sample (comprising 300 IPOs) does not contain those 28 companies that 
merely changed the market tier or had already been listed at a foreign stock exchange before 
going public at the Neuer Markt.
38 In addition, four companies from the financial services 
industry were excluded due to extraordinarily high values for the book value of assets or the 
issue volume.
39 Finally, another 21 companies could not be taken into consideration, since the 
issuing prospect was missing (in one case) or the total flotation costs were not available.  
Given the differences in the definition of venture capital in the US and Germany, I establish 
comparability of the empirical studies by dividing the Neuer Markt data set into three groups: 
160 non venture-backed IPOs (53.33%), 79 venture-backed IPOs (26.33%) and 61 companies 
(20.33%)
40, that merely received bridge financing by investors. As the latter investors 
typically have not invested seed, start-up and expansion capital next to bridge financing and 
therefore engage themselves at a rather late stage of the development of an company, the 
division made can be justified by the assumption that monitoring activities and thus the 
insider knowledge of these investors is of lower quality and thus of less worth with respect to 
their certification ability.
41  
                                                 
38   The following 28 companies have therefore been excluded: BB Biotech, BB Medtech AG, Bertrandt AG, 
Bipop-Carire S.p.A., Broad Vision Inc., COPE Inc., COR AG Insurance Technologies, Cybernet Internet 
Services International, Inc., Dialog Semiconductor Plc., DICOM Group, ebookers.com Plc., Electronics 
Line Ltd. (EL), Eurofins Scientific S.A., Fortec Electronik Vertriebs AG, GfN AG, integra S.A., LHS Group 
Inc., Lösch AG, Lobster Technology Holding AG, Micronas Semiconductor Holding AG, Mühl Product & 
Services AG, Pankl Racing Systems AG, Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG, Quiagen N.V., SCM 
Microsystems Inc., Sero AG, TEAM Communications Group Inc. and TIPTEL AG. 
39   These companies are ConSors Discount Broker, Comdirect AG, Direkt Anlage Bank AG and Entrium 
Direct Bankers AG. 
40   The sum of companies in the VC- and bridge financed group is lower than the number of venture-backed 
IPOs indicated by Deutsche Börse AG. The reason for this is that some of the backed IPOs have received 
equity as indicated by Deutsche Börse AG, which can neither be called venture capital nor private equity 
(including bridge financing). Instead, the capital theses companies received was offered by investment 
companies, e.g. by DEKA mbH., Rothschild Asset Management Ltd. or Invesco, without a selling intent. 
These IPOs have not been considered as backed IPOs. 
41   In order to find support for this assumption the monitoring skills of venture capitalists in comparison to 
those of bridge financiers are examined in m ore detail using proxies such as: the fraction of the issuing 
firm’s shares owned by the venture capitalist/bridge financier or the length of time that a venture 
capitalist/bridge financier has served on the supervisory board, see table 4.    13
In the descriptive study I therefore separately compare the venture-backed group and the sub 
sample of companies that received bridge financing to the non-venture backed group.
42 
Because of the focus on venture capitalists and their certification role, I concentrate on the 
venture and non venture-backed sub samples when testing the hypotheses.  
Detailed information was collected from the issuing prospectus for each IPO on the total 
volume of issues, the issuing procedure, the  offering expenses, the number of shares 
outstanding, the age of the company, the number of employees, the ownership structure, who 
is members of the “Aufsichtsrat”, the identity of invested venture capitalists or rather private 
equity companies and underwriters, and data of the financial statements.  
Additionally, further information was obtained through the media such as the first day of 
trading, the book-building spread, the initial offering price and the closing day bid price for 
the first day and 20 days after the IPO and information on the over-allotment option exercise 
(greenshoe).  
To clearly identify the VC-firms and private equity companies and their age, internet pages 
and company reports (if available), as well as the list of the full members of Bundesverband 
Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften  – German Venture Capital Association e.V. 
(BVK) and the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) were used. 
For the construction of the underwriter’s rating the information needed on lead management 
at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990 was provided by Deutsche Börse AG. 
A total of 104 different underwriters (45 different lead underwriters) have been involved in 
IPOs at Frankfurt stock exchange from March 1997 to March 2002.
43 Because of the changing 
or rather increasing issuing activity during that time period I construct a rating for each year
44. 
That is because the rating of an underwriter can change over time. The data of banks that 
merge during the investigation period (such as Bankhaus Gontard and Metallbank or 
Bayerische Vereinsbank and Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank) are aggregated in 
order to avoid major changes in the rating. However, changes in rating are desired in case of a 
relative increase of the issuing activity or a relative increase of the underwritten volume of 
                                                 
42   For the results of the tests (for equality of means (t-test) and equality of median (Mann-Whitney) see table 3, 
4 and table 6.  
43   WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER (1994) stress the dominant role of Deutsche Bank in the underwriter market 
during the time period 1961 to 1987, since Deutsche Bank has functioned as lead manager for almost 60% 
of the issues. This has changed during the time period 1990 to 2000. Although Deutsche Bank still belongs 
to the top issuers, their supremacy in underwriting has relatively been decreasing. 
44   Table A.2. presents the twelve best-rated underwriters serving as lead underwriter at Neuer Markt during the 
time period 1997 – 2002.  
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issues. The parent population is divided into seven rating categories and condensed to a 
dummy in the regressions.
45 In detail, the ratings of the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 are 
constructed using equally the track record of each underwriter as gauged by the relative share 
of lead management at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990
46 and the relative 
volume of proceeds of launched issues at the Neuer Markt 
47 as reported on December 31
st of 
the precedent year. Due to the lack of a track record of the relative volume of launched issues 
at the Neuer Markt for the year 1997, the rating of 1997 is solely based on each bank’s 
relative share of lead management at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990. 
However the rating that represents the quality of the venture capitalists and private equity 
companies is mainly based on the age of the company. VC and private equity companies 
founded before 1980 receive a very good rating (equivalent to 1), companies founded during 
the period 1980 to 1995 receive a mediate rating (equivalent to 2). Companies founded after 
1995 get the lowest rating (equivalent to 3). For some companies it was impossible to find 
information regarding their age. In these cases the assumption of little prestige resulting in a 
low rating (equivalent to 3) seems to be reasonable. The motive for using first of all the age as 
proxy for reputation is that in general there is a lack of a past performance. This fact is 
reflected in a total of 148 venture funds/companies
48 or private equity companies backing 140 
IPO firms: 99 of these (66.90%) back only one IPO firm, 34 (23%) back up to 4, and only 15 
(10.1%) back more than 5, up to 21 IPOs during the time period March 1997 – March 2002. 
Thus only in six cases
49 a relative high backing activity leads to an upgrade in rating during 
the period under consideration. In analogy to the underwriters’ rating, the information 
concerning the quality of the lead venture capitalist is condensed to a dummy in t he 
regressions.
50 
                                                 
45   The dummy has the value one in case the underwriter’s rating is very good; in any other case (1.5, 2, 2.5 or 
3, 3.5 and 4) the dummy is equivalent to zero. From 300 IPO companies under consideration, 102 have been 
underwritten by a prestigious lead underwriter rated very good. 
46   The relative share of lead management at all Frankfurt stock market segments for each year is calculated by 
cumulating the number of lead management for each bank since 1990 and dividing this number by the 
cumulated number of IPOs that took place since 1990. 
47   In order to calculate the relative volume of issues at the Neuer Markt for each bank I cumulate the volume of 
issues in € million each bank has underwritten (as lead- or co-underwriter) since 1997 and divide it by the 
total volume of issues in € million of all IPOs at the Neuer Markt since 1997. 
48   Only a third of these are member of the BVK. 
49   These financial intermediaries have been Advanced European Technologies N. V., Commerz Unterneh-
mensbeteiligungs AG, TFG Venture-Capital AG & Co. KGaA Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaft, Gold 
Zack AG, TVM Techno Venture Management GmbH and Schroders Ltd. 
50   The dummy is equal to unity if the financier’s rating is very good (this is the case for 29 out of the 79 
venture-backed IPOs or rather for 10 IPOs out of 61 backed by bridge financing); in any other case (2 or 3) 
the dummy is equivalent  to zero. (Table A.3. in the appendix presents the twelve best rated venture 
capitalists during the time period March 1997 - March 2002).   15
In line with LJUNGQVIST (1999), the venture capitalist with the biggest stake (which usually 
corresponds with the longest investment horizon within the portfolio company) is defined as 
the lead venture capitalist. 81 of the 148 venture funds/companies or private equity companies 
act as lead financier, whereas the remaining 67 merely engage themselves within a syndicate.
  
 
6.  Descriptive Statistics 
In terms of issuer characteristics (see Table 3), venture-backed companies differ most from 
non-venture backed with regard to EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) in thousand EURO 
per employee and profit on sales. Both ratios are on average significantly smaller: -11 versus 
24, and -44 versus -5. Given no significant differences in the number of employees, in age and 
balance sheet total, there seems to be evidence that these otherwise comparable IPO 
companies are less profitable when going public. This is remarkable.
51  
At the first glance the findings concerning offerings characteristics are in line with the results 
of LJUNGQVIST (1999). Venture-backed companies sell significantly more old shares when 
going public than non venture-backed companies. This is reflected by an average of 20.49% 
versus 13.20% of secondary sales of the total volume issued, and by an on average higher 
participation ratio of old stockholders (10.33% versus 5.22% of the shares outstanding before 
flotation). But  – and that might have a reversal effect to venture-backers being more 
concerned with pricing – the average and median participation ratio of managers in venture-
backed IPOs is significantly lower. To keep an eye on that and to differentiate between 
different groups of former stockholders, such as venture capitalists, managers and 
underwriters owning shares of the issuing company before the IPO seems to be worthwhile 
when running the regressions.
52  
Furthermore, the univariate analysis shows that venture-backed companies neither do seem to 
be less underpriced nor invest more money in marketing activities or the hiring of an 
expensive underwriter compared to those, which are non venture-backed. For both of the 
samples an underpricing of about 50% and a gross spread of about 5% can be reported (see 
Table 3). 
                                                 
51  See also RITTER/WELCH (2002, p. 1801). They mention that “[…] during the bubble, firms with no imme-
diate prospect of becoming profitable became common.” 
52   These groups do overlap as venture capitalists sometimes belong to the management.   16
Table 3: Issuer and Offering Characteristics and Costs of Venture-Backed respectively  
Bridge Financed Companies to Non Venture-Backed Companies Listed at the Neuer Markt. 
The data set consists of 160 non venture-backed IPOs (NVC), 79 venture-backed IPOs (VC) and 61 companies (BF) that 
received bridge financing. The participation ratio (for instance of the manager) is calculated by dividing the number of old 
shares sold (by the manager) by the (manager’s) number of shares outstanding before flotation. Underpricing is measured 
as the spread between the initial offering price and the opening price at the first day of trading. NEMAX is the stock market 
index of the Neuer Markt at Frankfurt stock exchange. The test for differences in means is a standard t-test, allowing for 
unequal variance. The test for differences in medians is the Kruskal-Wallis test. One, two and three asterisks indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
   Obs.  Mean  p-value  Median  p-value 
 Employees  NVC 160        243          130   
   VC   79        223       0.6422        113   0.8214 
   BF   60        132    0.0182**          64     0.0004*** 
 Age of company  NVC 160          11.5        9.5   
   VC   79          10.5  0.5458      8.0  0.4023 
   BF   61            9.5  0.1613      7.0  0.1735 
 Balance sheet total,   NVC 160  34.3      15.0   
 in million €  VC   79  29.2  0.5359    12.4  0.5200 
   BF   61  13.8      0.0057***      8.5    0.0009*** 
 EBIT in thousand €  NVC 160          23.9       8.4   
 per employee  VC   79         -10.8      0.0009***    -7.3   0.0000*** 
   BF   59         -11.9       0.0048***     0.6   0.0001*** 
 Profit on sales in % = EBIT  NVC 158           -5.14             6.59   
 in thousand € per sales  VC   77         -44.40      0.0010***          -7.39    0.0000*** 
 revenues in thousand €  BF   59          -38.31      0.0086***           0.64    0.0000*** 
 Issuing proceeds  NVC 160    82.67       38.24   
 incl. greenshoe option  VC   79    62.55  0.4646     47.60  0.1510 
 in million €  BF   61    43.64  0.2107     30.26    0.0334** 
 Old stocks sold in %  NVC 160    13.20       7.33   
 of total volume  VC   79     20.49      0.0013***     18.35  0.0016*** 
 of issues  BF   61    12.85  0.8764       9.96  0.8639 
 Participation old    NVC 160      5.22         2.39   
 stockholders  VC   79    10.33        0.0000***        7.49   0.0002*** 
   BF   61     5.15  0.9373        3.95    0.6874 
 Participation   NVC 160    3.39         1.78   
 managers  VC   78    1.26       0.0243**       0.24   0.0042*** 
   BF   61    1.42    0.0596*       0.00   0.0026*** 
 Underpricing in %  NVC 160    48.38       17.50   
   VC   79    52.44  0.6962     24.00  0.2528 
   BF   61    50.17  0.8738     18.43  0.5411 
 Relative direct costs  NVC 160     8.82       8.09   
   VC   79      8.68  0.7573     8.08  0.9287 
   BF   61      9.35  0.2849     8.94   0.0597* 
 Relative underwriting fees  NVC 160     5.31        5.17   
 (Gross spread)  VC   79     5.12  0.2741      5.13  0.4970 
   BF   61     5.30  0.9469      5.37   0.0988* 
 40 day log return of   NVC 160     2.56      -3.63   
 NEMAX before IPO  VC   79     5.77  0.3501     0.36  0.3489 
 In %  BF   61     0.55  0.5973    -5.44  0.4934 
   17
Before turning to the empirical results I will briefly highlight some further characteristics of 
venture-backed companies that distinguish them from those which received bridge financing 
and justifies the three categories made: On average about two thirds of the VC-backed compa-
nies have been financed by a syndicate before the IPO,
53 whereas issuing companies that 
received bridge financing dealt with more than one bridge financier only in one out of three 
cases (not reported).  
Table 4: Characteristics of Financial Intermediaries and Offering Characteristics of  
Venture-Backed and Bridge Financed IPO Companies at the Neuer Markt. 
The data set consists of 79 venture-backed IPOs (VC) and 61 companies (BF) that received 
bridge financing.  The participation ratio (e.g., of the lead venture capitalist or bridge financier, 
respectively) is calculated by dividing the number of old shares sold (by the lead venture capitalist 
or bridge financier, respectively) by the (lead venture capitalist’s and bridge financier’s 
respectively) number of shares outstanding before flotation. The test for differences in means is a 
standard  t-test, that allows differences in variance. The test for differences in medians is the 
Kruskal-Wallis test. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
   Obs.  Mean    p-value  Median    p-value 
 Number of venture 
 capitalists or bridge 
 financiers forming a  VC 79    2.68    0.0000***    2.00    0.0000*** 
 Syndicate  BF 61    1.36        1.00     
 Stake of lead venture 
 capitalist/ lead bridge 
 financier before IPO,  VC 78  27.10    0.0000***  22.55    0.0000*** 
 in %  BF 61  11.32       9.40     
 Stake of venture capitalists/ 
 bridge financiers before   VC 79  40.31    0.0000***  36.00    0.0000*** 
 IPO, in %  BF 61  12.80      10.00     
 Stake of lead venture 
 capitalist/ lead bridge 
 financier after IPO,  VC 78  15.54    0.0000***  12.90    0.0000*** 
 in %  BF 61    6.87        4.89     
 Stake of venture capitalists/ 
 bridge financiers after IPO,   VC 79  23.14    0.0000***  21.36    0.0000*** 
 In %  BF 61    7.91        6.30     
 Participation venture 
 capitalists/  VC 79  17.89    0.3934  16.67     0.0689* 
 bridge financiers  BF 61  21.44       8.24     
 Seats on the “Aufsichtsrat” 
 held by venture capitalists  VC 79  26.52    0.0000***  33.33    0.0001*** 
 Or bridge financiers, in %  BF 61  13.46        0.00     
 Duration of financial    VC 78        30    0.0000***         23    0.0000*** 
 relationship in months  BF 59          7               6     
 Dummy rating of lead 
 venture capitalist/  VC 79  39.24    0.0064***           0.00     0.0068** 
 bridge financier = 1  BF 61  18.03               0.00     
                                                 
53   On average a venture-backed company is financed by about three (see table 4), on maximum by twelve 
different venture firms/funds.   18
As can be seen in Table 4, compared to the stake of the lead venture capitalist that of the lead 
bridge financier is on average significantly higher before (27.10% versus 11.32%) and also 
after the IPO (15.54% versus 6.87%)
 54. This fact is all the more true for the average stake of 
the syndicate of venture capitalists compared to the stake of the group of bridge financiers 
(before the IPO 40.31% versus 12.80%; after the IPO 23.14% versus 7.91%). In addition, 
both groups of financial intermediaries sell on average about 20% of their pre-IPO stake at the 
IPO which seems to be much higher than in the United States.
55 
Furthermore, venture capitalists are more likely to command over more inside information 
than bridge financiers, since the former hold an average of 26.52%
56 versus 13.46% of the 
seats on the “Aufsichtsrat”. Besides venture capitalists have engaged themselves much longer 
in the issuing company before the IPO, namely about two years longer on average. And 
finally on average about 37% of the VC-backed sample are backed by a venture capitalist 
rated very good, while this is in only 16% the case within the sample containing IPOs backed 
by financial intermediaries offering private equity. 
Taking the proportion of ownership and degree of insider knowledge into account the bridge 
financiers’ certification ability seems to be modest. Therefore the results presented in the 
following are dispensed with the bridge financed sub sample. 
7.  Empirical Results 
The determinants of underpricing are examined applying a two-stage least square approach. 
In order to measure the ex-ante uncertainty concerning the value of an IPO company three 
different proxies are used: Similar to e.g. RITTER (1984), WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER (1994) 
and PRABHALA/PURI (1998) for each IPO company the annualized volatility of the 20 daily 
returns from day 1 to 21 ( vola) are calculated, which I expect to reflect the degree of 
dispersed information or rather uncertainty. Theory predicts a positive relation between 
uncertainty and underpricing. Since this proxy might be distorted due to underwriter price 
support in the aftermarket (see  LJUNGQVIST (1997)) the log of the number of employees 
                                                 
54   The numbers are much higher compared to those stated by BARRY ET AL. (1990) or HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER 
(2000). 
55   According to a study by BARRY ET AL. (1990) US venture capitalists own on average 34.3% prior and 24.6% 
after the IPO, thus they sell on average only 6.6% of their pre-IPO shares. 
56   This number is lower as the one reported by BARRY ET AL. (1990).    19
(empl) is included, as well. Large companies that go public and employ many people should 
be less underpriced than small companies.
57  
Following LJUNGQVIST/JENKINSON (2000) and LOUGHRAN/RITTER (2002), I calculate to what 
extend the book-building range (bookb) was exhausted. Issues priced at the maximum price 
limit, exhausting 100% of the book-building range, should be more underpriced compared to 
IPOs with an issue price that falls within the book-building range or below the minimum price 
limit. 
Besides I use the market trend, a proxy LÖFFLER (2000) and earlier UHLIR (1989) employed in 
their examination of underpricing. The market trend is estimated using the NEMAX
58 for the 
period forty days before the IPO ( nemax). As  LÖFFLER documents, there seem to exist 
(psychological/market) factors that lead to a significant positive relation between the trend of 
the Nemax and the degree of underpricing. Moreover in order to consider the different periods 
the data set is covering, i.e. a bull-market followed by a bear-market, a dummy (bear-market) 
is introduced. The dummy is equal to unity, given the IPO took place after the 10
th of March 
2000.  
One can either apply a dummy for “backed by venture capital” or less condensed information, 
i.e., the percentage of the venture capitalists’ equity holdings prior to the IPO (VCstake). 
Since it should make a difference whether a venture capitalist holds for instance 5% or 50% 
of a company prior to IPO, (as explained in section 4, see hypothesis 3b) I will use the latter.  
For the calculation of the non-underwriting costs of the going public process (exp) I use the 
log of the issuing volume (ln_volume) as instrumental variable, i.e. it should be correlated 
with  exp but not with  underpr. Moreover, in line with  HABIB/LJUNGQVIST (2001) and 
LJUNGQVIST (1999) I control for the participation ratio (participation), that is the fraction of 
shares former shareholder sell in the offering and the dilutions factor (dilution), which is 
determined as the number of new shares divided by the number of shares outstanding before 
flotation. 
With reference to the hypotheses discussed in section 4 and taking the trade-off between 
investing in costly actions that reduce underpricing and tolerating underpricing into account, 
this leads to the following system of regressions (regression coefficients with  a positive 
predicted sign are written in bold letters):  
                                                 
57   I also checked whether the age or the total volume of assets could serve as an explanatory variable for the 
amount of underpricing, but found no significant correlation. 
58   NEMAX is the stock market index of Neuer Markt at Frankfurt stock exchange. The introduction of this 
variable does not affect the other results found.   20
underpr = a0 + a1 vola + a2 bookb + a3 empl + a4 nemax + a5 bear-market + a6 Uwrank 
  + a7 VCrank + a8 VCstake + a9 participation + a10 dilution + a11 exp + e1 
exp =   b0 + b1 participation + b2 dilution + b3 ln_volume + b4 underpr + e2 
The estimation results are presented in Table 5.  
First of all I have to remark, that there is no evidence for a trade-off between non-under-
writing costs ( exp) and underpricing. In both regressions the variable under consideration 
(underpr and exp, respectively) lacks of significance. What follows is that there seems to be 
no trade-off for issuers at the Neuer Markt between investing in costly actions to reduce 
underpricing and tolerating higher underpricing. 
However, with regard to the regression for the normalized direct non-underwriting costs 
(exp), it can be stated that in line with the findings by HABIB/LJUNGQVIST (2001) the former 
shareholders (see column IV and V) seem to spend more on non-underwriting costs the more 
shares they sell, i.e. the more they participate in the offering. In contrast to the study by 
HABIB/LJUNGQVIST I find the normalized non-underwriting costs to be significantly 
negatively related to the ratio of new shares divided by the number of shares outstanding 
before flotation. The explanation for that might be similar to that for the regressor ln_volume . 
On average there are economies of scale. The higher the issuing volume the lower the amount 
of non-underwriting expenses per unit of issuing proceeds. 
My findings regarding the underpricing regressions do not support the concepts of BARRY 
(1989), H ABIB/LJUNGQVIST (2001), and  LJUNGQVIST (1999) (see hypothesis 4) that former 
shareholders selling large fractions of their pre-IPO assets do particularly care for the pricing. 
Due to the availability of data I could control for the incentives of the group of the former 
shareholders as a whole, for the managers (not reported) and venture capitalists (see columns 
III and VI) separately. But since the variables participation and dilution lack of significance - 
irrespectively of the identity of the group controlled for - I am not able to find evidence for 
underpricing to be lower due to incentives of former owners with a high selling intensity at 
the IPO.  
Also, concerning the certification role of venture capitalists and underwriters, I do not find 
any support either for hypotheses 2 or 3. On the contrary, companies that are backed by a 
prestigious venture capitalist experience greater underpricing: The coefficient VCrank=1 is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Remarkably, there is no significant outcome when     21
Table 5: Test of the Certification Hypotheses (I) 
 
In the following a two-stage  least square approach is applied. The dependent variables are 
underpricing ( underpr) and the normalized non-underwriting costs ( exp). The variable  vola is 
equivalent to the annualized volatility of the 20 daily returns from day 1 to 21, empl represents 
the log of the number of employees, bookb reflects the extend to which the book-building range 
was utilized, nemax incorporates the market trend forty days before the IPO. The dummy bear-
market is equal to unity, given the IPO took place after the 10th of March 2000. The variables
UWrank=1 and VCrank=1 are dummies for underwriters and venture capitalists rated very good. 
VCstake presents the venture capitalist’s equity holding prior to the IPO,  participation and 
dilution  are explained in footnotes 33 and 35, respectively.  Throughout, the interference is 
based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. One, two and three asterisks 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
I 
(1) underpr 
II 
(2) underpr
III 
(3) underpr 
IV 
(1) exp 
V 
(2) exp 
VI 
(3) exp 
Variables: 
 constant   0.389   0.403  0.464  4.428***  4.412***  4.110*** 
0.3292  0.3098  0.2130  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 vola      0.295***     0.294***     0.299***       
0.0049  0.0053  0.0078       
 empl    -0.083*  -0.083*  -0.083*       
0.0795  0.0766  0.0755       
 bookb     0.165**      0.152**     0.152*       
0.0349  0.0476  0.0502       
 Nemax      1.288***     1.298***    1.303***       
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000       
 bear-market    -0.137    -0.156*    -0.150*       
0.1157  0.0753  0.0718       
 UWrank=1  0.048  0.044  0.047       
0.5917  0.6086  0.5940       
 VCrank=1    0.310**    0.768**    0.708**       
0.0350  0.0105  0.0183       
 VCstake    -0.395**   -0.284  -0.250       
0.0350  0.1275  0.2854       
 participation_Old  0.022  0.054    1.349*  1.348*   
0.9674  0.9166    0.0527  0.0526   
 dilution_Old  0.241  0.245    -0.938***  -0.939***   
0.4398  0.4302    0.0013  0.0013   
 participation_VC      -0.091      0.762 
    0.8829      0.4316 
 dilution_VC      0.023      -0.059 
    0.6427      0.1470 
 ln_volume        -0.238***  -0.237***  -0.232*** 
        0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 underpr        0.074  0.079  0.092 
        0.4779  0.4387  0.3682 
 Exp  0.057  0.044  0.059       
  0.7683  0.8194  0.7720       
Interaction term:    -1.278**  -1.190**       
 VCrank=1  *  VCstake    0.0309  0.0422       
Adj. R
2  32.13%  33.08%  32.73%  14.35%  14.25%  8.46% 
Number of observations  238  238  238  238  238  238 
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controlling for venture capitalists with a lower rating (not reported). However, the effect 
found seems to be obscured: When interacting the dummy for the rating of prestigious venture 
capitalists with the percentage of the venture capitalists’ equity holdings prior to the IPO, this 
interaction term is negative and significant. But, in addition I do find an increase of the 
positive coefficient for prestigious venture capitalists. What follows, is that overall venture-
backed issues appear, if anything, to be more underpriced. 
This is in line with the results of  LJUNGQVIST (1999) for the 1990´s and those of FRANCIS/ 
HASAN (2001) and  SMART/ZUTTER (2000). Though it is in contrast with the results of 
LIN/SMITH (1998) or BARRY ET AL. (1990). The latter empirical studies show that the higher 
the venture capitalist’s reputation (measured for example by the venture capitalist’s age and 
the former backing activity), the lower the underpricing. I have re-estimated the regression 
using other factors that usually serve as proxies for the monitoring or backing-quality of 
venture capitalists, such as the natural logarithm of the age of the lead venture capitalist at 
IPO, the number of seats on the “Aufsichtsrat” held (in percent) and the age of the financial 
relationship. Unfortunately I did not get any further insights. Since the venture capitalists’ 
rating is mainly based on the age of the lead venture capitalists, it is not astonishing that this 
coefficient behaves equivalent to the dummy for the VC-rating: it is positive and significant. 
Concerning the other two coefficients, they are not statistically significant.  
With regard to the marginal effect of underwriter reputation I have to observe a general lack 
of significance of the coefficients. This suggests that companies, that have hired a prestigious 
lead underwriter when floating stocks are not better off than others. This result corresponds to 
earlier findings of KASERER/KEMPF (1995) for the German market. As expected, I obtain the 
same result when adding a term to the regression that interacts the rating of the underwriter 
with that of the venture capitalist (not reported).  
However, I find that all parameter estimates that represent the degree of ex-ante uncertainty 
(vola, bookb) or size (empl) show the predicted signs on a significant level. The smaller the 
issuing company and the annualized volatility of the 20 daily returns from day 1 to 21, the 
higher the underpricing. In addition, the more the book-building range was exhausted, the 
higher the underpricing. These results are in line with earlier studies on the German market, 
such as WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER (1994). The highly significant coefficient for the market 
trend (nemax) supports the findings of  LÖFFLER (2000): The initial return rises on average 
about 1.29% to 1.30% with each percentage point the log return of the Nemax is rising prior   23
to the IPO. Moreover, I do find evidence that the point in time a company went public had an 
influence on the level of underpricing. Companies going public in bear-markets, i.e. after 
March 10
th, 2000, showed on average a lower underpricing. 
In summary, no certification effect at the IPO could be found for venture capitalists or 
underwriters. Furthermore, there is no evidence that former stockholders selling shares at the 
IPO are particularly concerned about wealth loss and thus take influence on the pricing of an 
issue. Only hypothesis (1), which offers ex-ante uncertainty as a factor that determines 
underpricing finds considerable support. 
Extensions 
The question is why issues backed by prestigious venture capitalists appear to be  more 
underpriced. 
It seems to be puzzling, but similar results have been found before. FRANCIS/HASAN (2001) 
analyze a data set of companies going public in the United States during the period 1990 – 
1993 using a stochastic frontier model. They show that VC-backed IPOs suffer higher 
underpricing due to greater pre-market pricing inefficiencies, which are to a significant part 
deliberate and should compensate investors for information production. The study by 
SMART/ZUTTER (2000) examines dual- and single-class IPOs and indicates underpricing to be 
more pronounced among VC-backed companies, too. They attribute this result to the circum-
stance that an increasing number of IPO companies has been financed by younger VC 
companies, that possibly engage in “grandstanding”
59 by taking their companies earlier to the 
market and at a larger discount than do established VCs. 
LJUNGQVIST (1999), who analyzes a 1990s data set of IPOs, finds evidence that top 
underwriters are associated with significant increases in underpricing. An effect, which is in 
particular concentrated amongst venture-backed IPOs. But why do venture capitalists choose 
to work with prestigious investment banks whose pricing is so much worse? LJUNGQVIST 
offers an explanation:  There are situations, that are characterized by a conflict of interest 
between entrepreneur and venture capitalist. He considers the case, that the entrepreneur sells 
some shares at the IPO but the lead venture capitalist none. In such situation the venture 
capitalist is not concerned about engaging a prestigious underwriter who underprices more 
                                                 
59   For an intense study on the phenomenon “grandstanding”, see GOMPERS (1996). 
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than the average, since the incurring wealth losses have to be borne primarily by the selling 
owner rather than by himself.  
In my sample, in particular IPOs backed by prestigious or rather older venture capitalists are 
considerably more underpriced than IPOs that belong to any other segment. On average they 
are underpriced by 75.32% compared to 39.16% when backed by a less prestigious, younger 
venture capitalist or 48.38% when non venture-backed. It is surprising as these companies 
seem to be relatively large with respect to employees and EBIT in thousand EURO. IPOs 
backed by prestigious venture capitalists (PVC) have on average 243 employees (compare 
Table 3) and report on average earnings before interest and tax amounting to  € 729 
thousand
60. Moreover this result contradicts the idea of “grandstanding” and thus the 
explanation offered by  SMART/ZUTTER (2000). It thus seems to be rather interesting to 
analyze, whether the significant differences in underpricing can be explained by a non-selling 
behavior of venture capitalists, too.  
Table 6: Characteristics of IPOs Backed by Prestigious Venture Capitalists (PVC)  
and Those With Lower Reputation (NPVC) at the Neuer Markt 
The test for differences in means is a standard t-test, that allows differences in variance. The test for 
differences in medians is the Kruskal-Wallis test. Two asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level. 
      Obs.  Mean  p-value  Median  p-value 
Underpricing in %    PVC  29        78.32  0.0240**        51.97  0.0335** 
   NPVC  50        39.16          11.56   
No sale     PVC  29        17.24  0.4874          0.00  0.4839 
 venture capitalists  NPVC  50        24.00            0.00   
 
The descriptive statistic shows that 24% of the prestigious and about 17% of the lowest rated 
venture capitalists do not sell at IPO. These are 17 out of 79 VC-backed cases in total. In 
column (VII) of Table 7 I re-estimated the previous regression including a dummy for venture 
capitalists not selling at the IPO ( nosal_VC). Indeed, the impact of such a non-selling 
behavior of venture capitalists is in any case (regardless of the rating) a significant increase in 
underpricing. This result is robust but does not solve the original puzzle, since the coefficient 
for the dummy of IPOs backed by prestigious venture capitalists remains significant and 
positive, though smaller.  
                                                 
60  Non venture-backed companies reported on average earning before interest and tax amounting to € 2.830 
thousand.    25
Table 7: Test of the Certification Hypotheses (II) 
 
In the following a two-stage least square approach is applied. The dependent variables are 
underpricing  (underpr) and the normalized non-underwriting costs ( exp). The variable  vola is 
equivalent to the annualized volatility of the 20 daily returns from day 1 to 21, empl represents 
the log of the number of employees, bookb reflects the extend to which the book-building range 
was utilized, nemax incorporates the market trend twenty days before the IPO. The dummy 
bear-market  is equal to unity, given the IPO took place after the 10th of March 2000. The 
variables UWrank=1 and VCrank=1 are dummies for underwriters and venture capitalists rated 
very good.  VCstake presents the venture capitalist’s equity holding prior to the IPO, 
participation and dilution are explained in footnotes 33 and 35, respectively. Throughout, the 
interference is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. One, two and 
three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In columns VII 
and VIII, the effect of the presence of a prestigious venture capitalist is tested in an F-test. 
 
 Variables: 
VII 
(1) underpr 
VIII 
(2) underpr 
X 
(1) exp 
XI 
(2) exp 
 Constant  0.351  0.336     4.429***     4.403*** 
0.3654  0.3843  0.0000  0.0000 
 Vola      0.304***      0.309***     
0.0039  0.0031     
 Empl    -0.088*    -0.087**     
0.0583  0.0616     
 Bookb     0.185**     0.185**     
0.0177  0.0206     
 Nemax      1.248***      1.234***     
0.0000  0.0000     
 bear-market   -0.150*    -0,165*     
0.0845  0.0627     
 UWrank=1  0.047  0.063     
0.5830  0.4674     
 VCrank=1    0.719***    0.644***     
0.0052  0.0058     
 VCstake    -0.446**    -0.462**     
0.0267  0.0201     
 Participation_Old  0.396  0.286    1.350*     1.347* 
0.4617  0.5915  0.0527  0.0520 
 Dilution_Old  0.263  0.297     -0.938***    -0.939*** 
0.3922  0.3318  0.0013  0.013 
 Ln_volume        -0.238***    -0.237*** 
      0.0000  0.0000 
 Underpr        0.074  0.083 
      0.4623  0.4216 
 Exp  0.058  0.048     
  0.7562  0.8044     
 nosal_VC    0.337**    0.296*     
0.0347  0.0560     
 Conflict    0.223     
    0.2723     
 Interaction term:  -1.159**  -1.004**     
 VCrank=1  *  VCstake  0.0260  0.0371     
 Adj. R
2  33.75%  34.05%  14.35%  14.19% 
 F-test: VCrank, VCrank*VCstake  0.0252  0.0497     
 Number of observations  238  238  238  238 
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A further explanation why VC-backed IPOs are more underpriced is offered by  HAMAO/ 
PACKER/RITTER (2000). These authors examine IPOs in Japan. In Japan, venture capital funds 
are often affiliated with major financial institutions. This circumstance can lead to potential 
conflicts of interest, since the underwriting bank, if an owner of the issuing company, is 
interested in setting a higher offer price than it would if it was merely acting as a financial 
intermediary. Furthermore, these banks have increased incentives to overstate the company 
value to investors. Given that IPO investors do anticipate this conflict of interest, they will, 
according to theory, demand more underpricing as compensation.  
In line with this, HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER find higher initial returns for IPOs in which the lead 
venture capitalist is also the lead underwriter.
61 Although affiliations between venture capita-
lists and underwriting banks exist in Germany, too,
62 they are not as common as in Japan. 
I have tried to control for this phenomenon of affiliation for the German market, though I 
have only sixteen observations in the sample under consideration. However, the result lacks of 
significance and thus does not support this explanatory approach (see Table 7, column VIII).  
Even though I could demonstrate that the non-selling behavior of venture capitalists drives 
underpricing, the appearance of IPOs backed by prestigious venture capitalists being more 
underpriced deserves further examinations.  
Finally I would like to conclude with an illustration of the relative effect of underpricing on 
the venture capitalist’s return on investment when selling at IPO:  
A major German venture capitalist provided data on the historical costs of the shares of four 
IPO companies in my data set. I calculated the approximate return
63 from investment until 
IPO, using the offering price (OP) and the closing price (CP) on the first trading day.
64 As 
easily can be seen in Table 7, each of these investments was a success story for the venture 
capitalist, which partially was realized through selling at IPO.
65 But at least in the first three 
                                                 
61   Apart from this special case mentioned, HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER (2000) find that VC-backed IPOs exhibit a 
significant reduction in underpricing relative to other issues. 
62   Examples are Deutsche Venture Capital Gesellschaft and Deutsche Bank, Beteiligungsgesellschaft für die 
Deutsche Wirtschaft and Dresdner Bank AG, TFG Venture Capital and Concord Effekten AG or Commerz 
Unternehmensbeteiligungs AG and Commerzbank AG. 
63   As no information regarding the exact date of the initial investment is available, I am not able to calculate a 
time-adjusted return. 
64   In cases A, B and C, the offering price was fixed at the maximum price limit. In case D, which was 
overpriced, the offering price was fixed at the lower bound of the book-building range. 
65   As mentioned, on average venture capitalists sell 20% of their pre-IPO stake. Dividing the group into 
venture capitalists that sell and those that do not sell, the venture capitalists who sell shares at the IPO, sell 
on average about 28%. Only in one case the venture capitalist sold 100%.   27
cases the good result was accompanied by the knowledge, that the return on investment could 
have been better, if there had been no underpricing.  
Table 7: Returns on Four Investments of one Major German Venture Capitalist 
 
A  B  C  D 
Return OP  258%  132%  200%  519% 
Return CP  294%  182%  530%  506% 
 
Given, for the period under consideration the four companies above are a good example for an 
IPO portfolio of a venture capitalist in Germany, I would like to formulate some hypotheses, 
that could serve as further explanations for the findings of my empirical study and should 
therefore be tested in future: 
Venture capitalists seem not to care particularly about underpricing, as the bad news of money 
left on the table comes as part of a package that includes the good news of a successful partial 
exit.
66 Moreover venture capitalists seem to be  more concerned about the long-run 
performance and the timing of the further exit, since they retain on average more than three-
quarters of their shares beyond the IPO-date.
67  
8.  Summary and Outlook 
The main contribution of this empirical study is to shed further light on the growing 
importance of venture capital in Germany after the introduction of the Neuer Markt at the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In particular the role of venture capitalists and underwriters in 
certifying the quality of a company when going public is examined.  
Papers by CARTER/MANASTER (1990) and BOTH/SMITH (1986) argue, that the spread between 
the initial offering price and the opening price on the first day of trading (underpricing) should 
be lower for venture-backed IPOs compared to non venture-backed IPOs due to a reduced ex-
ante uncertainty concerning the value of the issuing company.  
However, to focus only on underpricing might be misleading. According to BARRY (1989) 
HABIB/LJUNGQVIST (2001), and LJUNGQVIST (1999) the behavior of old shareholders at the 
IPO is essential. The more they participate in the offering, that is the more shares they are 
                                                 
66   A similar argumentation based on the prospect theory can be found by LOUGHRAN/RITTER (2002), see also 
KAHNEMAN/TVERSKY (1979). 
67   For empirical studies on the U.S. market see for instance BRAV/G OMPERS (1997).   28
selling at the IPO, the more they have incentives to take influence leading to a reduced 
underpricing.   
When running the regressions to test the hypotheses that venture-backed IPOs are less 
underpriced compared to non venture-backed IPOs, I control for ex-ante uncertainty, for the 
market phase, for the venture-capitalists’ share of the company prior to the IPO, and, taking 
Ljungqvist’s argument into account, for the incentives of old shareholders to reduce 
underpricing. 
Turning to the results of this study, the huge number of financial intermediaries engaged in 
IPOs at Neuer Markt is worth mentioning: 104 underwriters and 148 venture capitalists or 
rather private equity companies.  
Concerning the companies that went public at the Neuer Markt, I found that VC-backed 
companies are less profitable compared to non venture-backed companies. Though, they are 
similar with respect to number of employees, age, balance sheet total or the amount of 
underpricing and the relative fee charge by the underwriting banks. Venture-backed firms 
issue significantly more old shares compared to non venture-backed ones. The fact that the 
group of venture capitalists sells on average 20% of their pre-IPO stake at the IPO supports 
this assumption. 
More than two thirds of the VC-backed companies have been financed by a syndicate of 
venture capitalists. They seem to have considerable influence, since they hold on average a 
stake of about 40% of the company before the IPO and about 26.5% of the seats on the 
“Aufsichtsrat”. 
 
When running the regressions I consider the approach of  HABIB/LJUNGQVIST (2001), who 
take underpricing as endogenous to the problem of minimizing the former shareholder’s total 
wealth loss when going public. Thus, a two-stage least square approach is calibrated. 
However, there  is no evidence for a trade-off between non-underwriting costs and under-
pricing. In both regressions the variable under consideration (underpr and exp, respectively) 
lacks of significance. 
With reference to the results of the regressions, there is strong evidence that the higher the ex-
ante uncertainty about the value of a company going public the higher the underpricing. 
Furthermore, the market trend has a non-negligible positive impact on the amount of 
underpricing. However, the use of this variable does not affect the other results found.  
With regard to the certification role of underwriters and/or venture capitalists, I am unable to 
provide evidence. It does not seem to pay to hire a prestigious intermediary, at least as far as   29
underpricing is concerned. On the contrary: The involvement of a prestigious venture 
capitalist leads to a higher underpricing. This finding holds, irrespective of whether I control 
for venture capitalist not selling at the IPO (following the argumentation of LJUNGQVIST 
(1999)) or for conflicts of interest due to an affiliation of the venture capitalist and the 
underwriting bank (in line with HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER (2000)). The finding that prestigious 
venture capitalists appear to lead to more underpricing, warrants further research.  
 
When interpreting these results one should keep in mind that venture capitalists sell only on 
average about 20% of their shares at the IPO. Thus an examination of their further exit 
strategy would be of utmost interest. Not least as the (timing of the) exit seems to be decisive 
for the venture capitalist’s return on investment and thus the building up of further reputation.    30
Appendix Figures: 
Figure A.1: Development of Gross Investments of Members of the BVK (in € Mio.)  
and Number of Beneficiary Companies 
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Appendix Tables:  
Table A.1: Data Set Neuer Markt - March 10, 1997 - December 31, 2001
68 
Year 
Number of 
Venture-
Backed IPOs  VC in % 
Number IPOs 
Backed by 
Bridge 
Financing  BF in % 
Number of 
Non Venture-
Backed IPOs  NVC in %  Total 
1997 3  37.50%   1  12.50%   4  50.00%    8 
1998 10  27.03%   6  16.22% 21  56.76%  37 
1999 30  24.79% 23  19.01% 68  56.20% 121 
2000 34  27.42% 29  23.39% 61  49.19% 124 
2001 2  20.00%   2  20.00%   6  60.00%  10 
Total 79  26.33% 61  20.33%        160  53.33%   300
69 
 
                                                 
68   There were no IPOs in 2002 until March 26. 
69   The original sample consisted of 353 issues, 53 of which had to be deleted due to either data problems, 
extreme values for issue size, or because the issue merely represented a change of market segment.   31
 
Table A.2: The Twelve Best Rated Underwriters Serving as Lead Underwriter  
at the Neuer Markt During the Time Period 1997 - 2001 
This table contains the twelve best rated underwriters serving (more than 5 times) as lead underwriter 
at the Neuer Markt during the time period 1997 to 2001. The u nderwriter rating of the year 1997 is 
based on the relative share of lead management at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990; 
ratings of the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 are using equally weighted the t rack record of each 
underwriter concerning the relative share of lead management at all Frankfurt stock market segments 
since 1990 and the relative proceeds of issues launched at the Neuer Markt since 1997. A top rating is 
equivalent to one, the lowest rating equals the value of 4 (non rated). 
Underwriter 
 
Rating 
1997 
Rating 
1998 
Rating 
1999 
Rating 
2000 
Rating 
2001 
Deutsche Bank AG  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 
(Bayerische Hypotheken- u. Wechsel-
bank / Bayerische Vereinsbank) 
1.0  2.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Commerzbank AG  1.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  1.0 
DG BANK AG  2.0  2.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Dresdner Bank AG  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0 
BHF-Bank AG / ING Group  2.0  2.5  2.0  2.0  2.0 
Goldman Sachs   3.0  3.0  2.0  1.5  1.5 
West LB Girozentrale  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt KGaA  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.0  1.5 
Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie.   4.0  3.5  2.0  1.5  2.0 
Credit Suisse First Boston  4.0  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5 
Gontard & MetallBank AG  
(Heinrich Gontard & Co. OHG/ 
Metallbank GmbH) 
4.0  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.0 
   32
 
Table A.3: The Twelve Best Rated Venture Capitalists / Private Equity Companies  
Backing Companies that Went Public  
at Neuer Markt During the Period March 1997 - March 2002 
The rating representing the quality of the venture capitalists and private equity companies is mainly 
based on the age of the company. Venture capitalists and private equity companies founded before 
1980 received a very good rating (equal to 1), companies founded before 1995 and after 1980 received 
a mediate rating (equivalent to 2). Companies founded after 1995 got the lowest rating (equivalent to 
3). Thus only in six cases (Advanced European Technologies N. V., Commerz Unternehmensbeteili-
gungs AG, TFG Venture-Capital AG & Co. KGaA Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaft, Gold Zack 
AG and TVM Techno Venture Management GmbH) an relative high backing activity during the time 
period under consideration leads to an upgrade in rating. 
VC / private equity companies  Founded in  Backed IPO 
companies 
(as Lead VC) 
Rating 
3i Group Plc. /3i Deutschland  1945  21   (16)  1 
Apax Partners & Co. Beteiligungsberatung AG  1969   5    ( 2)  1 
Atlas Venture Germany  1980  5    ( 2)  1 
Deutsche Beteiligungs(gesellschaft) AG   1965  3    ( 2)  1 
BdW Beteiligungsgesellschaft für die deutsche 
Wirtschaft mbH & Co. KG 
1969  2    ( 1)  1 
VC Baden-Württemberg GmbH  1970  2    ( 2)  1 
WestKB  
Westdeutsche Kapitalbeteiligungs mbH  
1969  2    ( 1)  1 
Gold-Zack AG  1990  13   (12)  2 upgrade to 1 
in 1999 
Advanced European Technologies N.V.   1995  7     (6)  2 upgrade to 1 
in 1999 
TVM Techno Venture Management GmbH  1983  6    ( 3)  2 upgrade to 1 
in 2000 
Commerz Unternehmensbeteiligungs AG  1987  6    ( 2)  2 upgrade to 1 
in 1998 
TFG Venture-Capital AG & Co. KGaA   1994  5    ( 4)  2 upgrade to 1 
in 2000   33
Appendix  
Model of BARRY (1989), extended by HABIB and LJUNGQVIST(2001): 
 
Consider a company that has (S0) shares outstanding prior to going public and that issues (SN) 
new shares at the IPO. In such a case the former shareholders suffer a wealth loss due to 
underpricing and dilution. The amount of wealth loss  is inter alia dependent on the 
participation ratio and the dilution factor. 
The participation ratio (participation) is the ratio of the number of old shares sold (S0,S) to the 
number of shares outstanding before the flotation (S0). The dilution factor (dilution) is the 
ratio of new shares (SN) to the number of shares outstanding before the flotation (S0).  
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, 0
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Let (P0) be the initial offer price, and let (P1) be the opening price at the first day of trading. 
In an efficient-market, this opening price at the first day of trading should reflect the 
(unobservable) value of the company prior to the IPO (S0 P*) plus the value of the money 
raised through flotation (ignoring the commission and other direct costs of going public): 
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The smaller the offering in relation to the number of shares previously outstanding, the 
smaller the dilution effect. Thus the aggregated wealth loss of the former stockholders per old 
share (awl) is equivalent to: 
( ) ( ) 1
0
0
0
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S
P P
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Given that the offering is underpriced, that is P* > P1 > P0, old shareholders suffer the greatest 
aggregate wealth loss when selling all of their shares in the IPO. In summary, former owners 
“will be more concerned with underpricing as the size of the issue grows (relative to their own 
holdings) or as they participate more by offering more of their own shares” (BARRY (1989), 
p. 1102).   34
The extension of this model takes the possibility of costly actions into consideration, namely 
actions that influence the offer prices and thus reduce underpricing and wealth losses. Such 
costs (exp) could for example arise in connection with extensive marketing efforts prior to the 
IPO. These costs have to be add to the aggregated wealth loss arising from underpricing and 
dilution. Former shareholders therefore are assumed to minimize these so called total wealth 
losses per old share (twl): 
 
twl  ”  awl + exp 
 
“There is a trade-off between spending more (higher exp) and tolerating higher underpricing. 
At the optimum, the marginal effect of increasing exp to reduce underpricing should equal the 
marginal costs of doing so, implying that total wealth losses are invariant, at optimum, to 
exp.” (see LJUNGQVIST (1999), p. 6).   35
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